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It is  argued  that there  is  a surprising  gap  in  the  distribution  of adverbial  modifiers, 
namely  that  there  are  (practically)  no  adverbs  that  modify  exclusively  stative  verbs. 
Given the general range of selectional restrictions associated with adverb/verb modifica-
tion, this comes as a surprise. It is argued that this  gap cannot be the result of standard 
selectional  restrictions.  An independently  motivated  account  of the  state-event  verb 
contrast, in which state verbs are proposed to lack Davidsonian arguments is presented 
and argued to account for this stative adverb gap. Some apparent and real problems with 
the analysis are discussed. 
1.  Introduction 
In early work on adverbial modification (Jackendoff 1972, Thomason and Stalnaker 1973), a 
fundamental distinction was drawn between S-adverbs and VP-adverbs.  S-Adverbs such as 
probably and luckily appear relatively 'high' in the sentence and are ruled out sentence finally, 
while VP  adverbs  such as  quickly  and  merrily  appear  'lower'  and  are  permitted sentence 
finally. Thomason and Stalnaker argued that S-adverbs and VP-advcrbs are to be semantically 
distinguished. They claimed that S-adverbs are propositional modifiers, while VP-adverbials 
are predicate modifiers;  that is,  the distinction between them is  articulated in terms of the 
semantic objects that they modify. This semantic distinction was taken to account for some of 
the contrast between them, for example the fact that the S-adverb probably is  acceptable in 
(la) while the VP adverb quickly is ruled out in (1 b). 
(1)  a.  It  was probably true that Bill kissed Jill. 
b.  *It was quickly true that Bill kissed Jill 
One of the additional features that distinguishes S-adverbs from VP-adverbs is their selecti-
vity.Generally speaking, S-adverbs are unrestricted with respect to the sentences they appear 
in. VP adverbs, on the other hand, are sensitive to the type ofverb they modi!)'. For example, 
althoughprobably can appear in both (2a) and (2b), quickly can only appear in (3a). 
(2)  a.  John probably loved Mary. 
b.  John probably kissed Mary. 
(3)  a.  *John loved Mary quickly. 
b.  John kissed Mary quickly. 
Thomason and Stalnaker noted that the type of verb-adverb selection illustrated in (3) could 
not be accounted far direct1y on their theory. Since love Mary is every much a predicate as 
kiss Mary is, there is no type-theoretic reason that (3a) should not be acceptable. Noting that 
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such adverbs as quickly cannot modify stative verbs, they suggested that predicates be marked 
stative or eventive, and that VP adverb modification be made sensitive to this marking. 
What Thomason and Stalnaker failed to note, however, was that adverbs select only against 
stative verbs and for eventive verbs. We don't, it seems, find adverbs that appear with stative 
verbs and but not with eventive verbs. That is, we don't find an adverb that fits the schema in 
(4). 
(4)  a.  John loved Mary ADVERB. 
b.  *John kissed Mary ADVERB. 
Adverbs are sensitive to the state/event contrast, but only in one way. If an adverb can felici-
tously modify astate verb, then it can also felicitously modifY some event verb as weil. This 
lexical  gap,  which we  will  call  the  stative  adverb  gap  (SAG),  is  striking  and  should be 
accounted for by any theory of  adverbial modification.1 
In  this  paper,  I  discuss  why  the  SAG  is  particularly  problematic  for  the  popular  neo-
Davidsonian theories ofsentence interpretation, ofthe type proposed by Bach (1986), Parsons 
(1990),  Wyner (1994)  and  others.  Then I  present  an  altemative  theory,  which I  call  the 
classical Davidsonian theory, from which the SAG follows as a natural consequence. 
2.  Neo-Davidsonian theory 
N eo-Davidsonian approaches to sentence semantics have grown in popularity since the early 
work of Bach (1981) and Parsons (1985). To review briefly. the fundamental neo-Davidso-
nian assumption is the following: 
•  Verbs denote predicates of eventualities (states or events) 
This  fundamental  assumption about verbal meanings makes  available a  simple analysis of 
adverbial modification, which can be given in slogan form as  follows  (see Parsons (1990), 
Kamp and Reyle (1993), and Wyner (1994) for details): 
•  VP adverbs denote predicates of  eventualities 
•  VP adverbial modification is (essentially) simple conjunction 
Additionally many neo-Davidsonians adopt the view that verbs are related to their nominal 
arguments via Thematic roles relations.  The example derivation  in (5)  illustrates the main 
features of  the approach. 
(5)  a.  John leave; A e [leaving(e) & Agent(e) =  John]] 
b.  slowly; A P A e [P(e) & slow(e)] 
c.  John left slowly ;:3 e [leaving(e) & Agent(e) = John & slow(e) & e < now] 
An untensed clause is (like a bare verb) interpreted as a predicate of events. Nominal argu-
ments simply introduce further (conjunctive) information about participants in the event. VP-
1  I have been made aware of!wo apparent counterexamples to tbis claim: still and no  langer.  These will be 
discussed towards the end of  the paper. 
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adverbs, while technically of a higher type, also introduce into the LFs underlying first order 
predication over events. This conjunctive modification accounts for the most obvious entail-
ment facts  about adverbial modification, namely that a modified sentence such as John  left 
slowly entails the unmodified John  left.  (In many neo-Davidsonian accounts, tenses are also 
taken to add conjunctive infonnation, locating the time at which the eventuality OCCUfS with 
respect to the speech time, as we have indicated.) 
Note that on the neo-Davidsonian account the contrast between S adverbs  and VP  adverbs 
then is not that between propositional modifiers and predicate modifiers, but rather between 
propositional modifiers and event predicates. 
Besides the entailment facts just mentioned, the neo-Davidsonian approach articulates nicely 
the  elose  relation  many  adverbs  hold  to  their  cognate  adjectives.  Given  a  semantics  for 
nominals like John's leaving in which such expressions denote events (see Zucchi (1993)), the 
near-synonymy between (Sc) and (6) is fonnally reconstructed. 
(6)  John's leaving was slow 
Modulo definiteness (6) and (Sc) have the same meaning, and on the neo-Davidsonian view 
they are given the same semantic analysis.  The underlying predicate slow is taken to be the 
common semantic element, which is predicated ofthe underlying event introduced by leave.2 
A further appealing iunovation of the neo-Davidsonian approach,  one that is  central to  OUf 
concems here, is the treatment ofVendler/Dowty-type aspectual classes (Vendler 1967; Dow-
ty 1979). Since (all) verbs are interpreted as predicates ofeventualities, the distinctions among 
the  aspectual elasses can be characterized in tenns of properties of these eventuality predi-
cates. The most straightforward characterization is the following (taken from Bach (1986)): 
•  State verbs are those verbs that denote predicates of  states. 
•  Activity verbs are those verbs that denote predicates of  homogeneous events. 
•  Accomplishment  verbs  are  those  verbs  that  denote  predicates  of non-homogeneous 
events. 
•  Achievement verbs are those verbs that denote predicates of  momentary events. 
Given that adverbs,  like verbs,  are predicates of events, we  might also  classify adverbs in 
tenns of  the character of  the underlying eventuality predicate which they denote. Much as we 
characterize the verbs run and walk as activity verbs because they are homogenous predicates 
of events, we might characterize continually as an activity adverb, because it too is a homoge-
neous predicate of  events. 
On the neo-Davidsonian theory, then, a stative adverb would simply be an adverb that applies 
only to states. While it is certainly not aprediction of the neo-Davidsonian perspective that 
such adverbs should exist, the theory also doesn't rule them out. For the neo-Davidsonian the 
SAG  is  merely an accidental lexical  gap,  and  a somewhat surprising one,  considering the 
central  role  that  the  state-event  contrast  plays  in  the  verbal  domain  (see  Dowty  1979  or 
Himichs 1985 eh. 1, Katz 1995). 
2  In other work (Katz 1999), I have suggested that accounting for  this  fundamental parallelism in a compo-
sitional way in a neo-Davidsonian framework is not at all straightforward, if it is even possible. 
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3.  Verb-Adverb Selection and the Stative Adverb Gap 
Verb-adverb selection is a complex phenomenon (Jackendoff 1972, Rochette 1990). It is clear 
that certain adverbs appear with some types of  verbs but not with other types of  verbs. This is 
ilIustrated by the pairs in (7) - (9). 
(7)  a.  Austin tripped accidentally. 
b.  ?? Austin wrote his book accidentally. 
(8)  a.  Melanie talked endlessly. 
b.  ??Melanie finished her book endlessly. 
(9)  a.  Steve finished his book quickly. 
b.  ??Steve slept quickly. 
Intuitively, the infelicity of (7b), (8b) and (9b) seems somehow to  be tied to  an incompatibi-
lity between the verbal and adverbial meanings. In (7b), for example, the fact that for an event 
to  be  accidental  it  must  be  done  without  intent  seems  to  conflict  with  fundamental 
intentionality ofan event ofbook-writing. Youjust can't write a book accidentally. 
The neo-Davidsonian approach, of  course, gives us a way of  making this intuition precise. On 
this approach one can simply say that verb-adverb selection is a reflection of  the compatibility 
or  incompatibility of the event predicates.  Infelicity  results  from  attempting  to  apply  two 
incompatible predicates to the same event. In other words, verb-adverb selection is essentially 
the  same phenomenon as  c1assical  "selectional restrictions"  of the  type  illustrated  in  (10) 
(Chomsky 1965; Katz and Fodor 1964). 
(10)  a.  ??My shirt wants to go horne. 
b.  ??My thoughts were very tall. 
Just as there is an incompatibility being a shirt and being an object with desires (at least given 
our normal everyday world), and between being tall and being a thought, there is an incompa-
tibility between being an event of book-writing and it being an accidental event. In both the 
c1assical  cases  and  the  verb-adverb  cases  it  is  incompatible  co-predication  that  is  the 
fundamental source of  the infelicity. 
We might, in fact,  derive the infelicity from Grice's (Grice 1975) Maxim of Informativeness. 
We would say that a predicate Q violates the selectional restrictions of a predicate P iff it is 
not possible that any individual to satisfy both P and Q. If it is not possible for an individual 
to  be both P and Q,  it is uninformative to  claim that there is  an x such that P(x) and Q(x), 
since such a claim would necessarily be false. This uninformativeness is what gives rise to the 
infelicity we feel in the case of selectional restrictions. (Naturally, I am ignoring the fact that 
in typical cases it is the presuppositions associated with one or the other of  the predicates that 
is  incompatible with the other predicate, but that need not concern us.)  A sentence such as 
(11),  then,  gives  rise  to  a  selectional-restriction violation because the  predicate  bachelor, 
meaning unmarried man, is not compatible with the property of having a wife (which is the 
presupposition associated with the use ofthe possessive in (11)). 
(11)  ??The bachelor's wife was charming. 
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Note that when selectional restrictions are violated,  speakers often attempt to reinterpret the 
sentence so as to "save" the utterance. In the case of (11) a hearer might reinterpret the phrase 
the bachelor as  making reference to a man who, while married, has many other features  of 
bachelorhood. This process of reinterpretation is also evident in such sentences as (7b), (8b) 
and (9b). In attempting to "save" (7b), for example, we might reinterpret accidentally to mean 
something like effortlessly and quickly, which would then be compatible with book writing. 
Or we might interpret finish in (8b) to mean work on finishing. That this kind of reinterpreta-
tion is evident in the both the case of verb-adverb selection and of subject-predicate selection 
is one indication that they are one and the same phenomenon. 
At  first  glance, of course, it  seems  that an account of the SAG that appeals  to  this kind of 
verb-adverb selection would be the most straightforward and obvious account there could be: 
Adverbs  that  don't appear  with  state  verbs  are  simply  adverbs  that  happen  to  select  for 
dynamic or agentive properties of an eventuality. The fact that (12) is infelicitous, then, is not 
a gramrnatical fact, but simply another example ofthe kind ofverb-adverb selection we saw at 
work in (7) - (9). 
(12)  ??Peter knew Mary gently. 
The reason (12) is odd is simply that gently, being a manner of action adverb, is a predicate 
that holds of an eventuality if and only if the manner in which the eventuality was acted out 
was gentle. Know, on the other hand, is a predicate of states. States, being static do not have 
manners of being acted out, and so it is not possible for gently and know to  apply to the same 
eventuality. 
This much is fine. The problem is that this kind of account only explains why certain adverbs 
do not combine with state verbs. It doesn't account for the stative adverb gap, that is we don't 
have an explanation for why there are no adverbs that combine with state verbs but not event 
verbs. In fact, we are stuck thinking there should be some adverbs out there that are formally 
like  gently,  in that  they  are  predicates  of eventualities,  except  that  they  select  for  non-
dynamic, non-agentive eventualities.  This kind of gap  is,  in fact,  not at  all  characteristic of 
selectional restrictions as we know them from the classical subject-predicate case. 
Typically, selectional restrictions are symrnetrical. That is, if  P and Q are incompatible predi-
cates,  we can usually find  a P' and a Q' such that P and  Q' are  compatible, P' and Q are 
compatible, and P' and Q' are incompatible. Consider the case in (13): 
(13)  ??My thoughts are tall. 
Here P is being a  thought  and  Q  is  being tall.  These predicates  are  incompatible.  But of 
course we can find  both a P' and  a Q' that result in acceptable variants,  namely  being a 
mountain and being confused. 
(14)  a.  The mountain is tall. 
b.  My thoughts are eonfused. 
The point is this: We don't have just predieates that seleet for mental objeets to the exclusion 
of,  say,  physieal  objeets,  we also  have  predieates  that  seleet  for  physieal  objeets  to  the 
exclusion of mental objeets. It might seem that we are simply eommenting on the aeeidental 
properties of the  lexieon.  I think,  however,  that  there is  good reason to  expeet seleetional 
restrietions exhibit this kind of symmetry. 
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Selectional  restrictions  reflect  the  semantic  compatibility  between  predicates  of different 
syntactic category.  In the  classical case,  this  is  compatibility between nouns and verbs  or 
adjectives. Since the kind of compatibility we are concemed with here is purely "real world" 
compatibility, and there is no apriori association of classes of meanings (beyond semantic 
type)  to  syntactic  categories,  we  expect  that the  classes  of compatible  (and  incompatible) 
predicates  should  be  distributed  evenly  among  the  syntactic  categories.  If two  syntactic 
categories are of the same semantic type, then for any lexical elements from  one category, 
there should be an element from the second that denotes a compatible predicate and one that 
denotes  an  incompatible  predicate.  If there  are  syntactic  contexts  in  which  the  semantic 
combination rule for these categories is conjunctive, then selection restriction violations will 
exhibit paradigmatic symmetry. We might, then, take symmetry, alongside reinterpretation, to 
be  a  test  for  whether  a  particular  infelicity  is  due  to  seleetional  restriction  violations  or 
something else. 
Paradigmatic syrnmetry, of  course, is exactly what is missing in the case of  adverbial selection 
of stative verbs.  We  only have adverbs that select for  event verbs to  the exclusion of state 
verbs and not adverbs that seleet for state verbs to the exclusion of event verbs. Interestingly, 
if we  leave stative verbs aside,  we see that other types of verb-adverb  selection do  exhibit 
symmetry. That is, we find sueh paradigms as (15). 
(15)  a.  ??John slept quickly. 
b.  lohn ran quickly. 
c.  lohn slept deeply 
d.  ??lohn ran deeply. 
The fact that in the case of adverbial modification of stative verbs there is no  paradigmatic 
symmetry,  suggests to  me that the SAG has  a grammatical basis.  In the following section I 
will propose that there is a grammatical distinction between event verbs and state verbs from 
which the SAG follows as a natural consequence. 
4.  Accounting for the Stative Adverb Gap 
An often-expressed intuition is  that the crucial distinction between states and events is that 
states  simply don't have many properties.  Events are much more interesting,  and therefore 
there is much more to be said about them. Because of this, they are compatible with a larger 
class of predicates, and thus event verbs combine felicitously with more adverbs then state 
verbs do. To analogize, if events are like paintings, states are like blank canvases. Both have 
dimensions, but for a canvas, that is about all there is to it, whereas for a painting we can talk 
about the theme of the painting, the shading, the use of light and so on.  In the case of states 
and  events,  while  we  can  talk  about  the  dimensions  of both  (i.e.  their  spatio-temporal 
properties),  for  events there  is  simply so  much more;  we can also talk about their manner, 
their speed and their causes and effects and their purposes. 
I find this intuition compelling, and take it to show us is that events and states are not two 
classes  of the  same  type of object,  as  the  neo-Davidsonian would have  it,  but rather that 
events are highly articulated things of which states are the  most simple form.  In the next 
section, I give this intuition formal expression and show how this formal mechanism accounts 
for the stative adverb gap.  The lack of stative adverbs, then, is not an accidental property of 
the lexicon, but in fact follows from the character of  the state/event distinction. 
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4.1.  The State/Event Distinction 
In Davidson's (1967) paper he suggests that "fact" verbs be distinguished from event verbs in 
that they lack an extra event argument. Davidson's tentative suggestion has been adopted by a 
number of researchers and pushed into service to  account for some of the more weU-known 
state/event contrasts (see Galton (1984), Löbner (1988), Sandstmm (1993), and Katz (1995)). 
The  basic idea is  that  state  verbs  are  distinguished from  event verbs by the absence of a 
Davidsonian argument.  The  event  sentence  (16a)  and  the  state  sentence  (16b),  then,  have 
different logical representation, as shown in (17). 
(16)  a.  Sandy kissed Kim. 
b.  Sandy liked Kim. 
(17)  a.  :I e [kiss(e,Sandy,Kim)] 
b.  like(Sandy,Kim) 
On this approach, as  we see, state verbs are of a different logical type than are event verbs 
with the same number ofNP arguments. There are two things to note: First, the fact that there 
are no underlying states in the logical form for (16b) requires us  to adopt an "ordered argu-
ment" account ofthe verb-argument relations (Dowty 1991), at least for stative sentences. For 
uniformity, it seems sensible to  adopt such an account generaUy.  Secondly, once existential 
closure has applied to the event sentence, state sentences and event sentences are of the same 
logical type. It is in this sense that event sentences are also like state sentences but are simply 
more articulated. 
General discussion of the empirical advantages of this  approach to  the state/event contrast, 
which I will caU the "classical" Davidsonian approach, would take us too far afield here (but 
see, Katz (1997); Katz (2000)). Let us just take a single example. Consider the fact, illustrated 
in (18), that state verbs cannot appear as bare infinitive complements ofperception verbs. 
(18)  a.  Peter saw Sue leave. 
b.  *Peter saw Sue wear a coat. 
It is  standardly assumed that these complements are  interpreted as  indefinite descriptions of 
the eventuality introduced by the complement verb (Higginbotham 1983). State verbs such as 
wear in wear a  coal,  which clearly would refer  to  perceivable states,  are  for  some reason 
prohibited in this  context.  This prohibition foUows  naturaUy  if these verbs  simply lack an 
eventuality  argument.3  The  grammatical  mechanism  which  tums  bare  infinitivals  into 
eventuality descriptions is simply unable to apply to them. A number of  event/state contrasts 
in the  domain of nominalization,  sentential anaphora,  and  tense  interpretation are likewise 
amenable  to  classical  Davidsonian  analyses.  And,  of course,  my claim  is  that  the  stative 
adverb gap is as weIl. 
In the next section I present the  outlines of my particular classical Davidsonian account of 
sentence interpretation. I present several details which are not, in fact,  relevant to the treat-
ment of adverbials, but which I think, aid in the understanding of  the mechanism. 
3  Higginbotham himself makes a similar proposal. Unfortunately he confuses the statelevent contrast with the 
stage-Ievellindividual-Ievel contrast (Carlson 1977). That such stage-level statives as wear a coat are prohobited 
is something his proposal does not explain. 
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4.2.  Classical Davidsonianism 
Since both state sentences and event sentences have temporal components to their semantics, I 
will assume that both saturated state verbs and saturated event verbs are predicates of times. 
Tenses will apply to these time predicates to  yield propositional meanings. The "upper" part 
of  the system, then, is fairly standard: 
•  Sentence meanings are propositions 
•  Fully saturated verbs are properties of  times 
•  Tenses are functions from predicates oftimes to propositions 
We will distinguish fully saturated verbs from "nominally" saturated verbs. Nominally satura-
ted verbs are those that have all their nominal arguments, but may be missing an underlying 
implicit argument. The basic assumption of the classical Davidsonian approach is that even-
tive  verbs  can  be  nominally  saturated  without  being  fully  saturated.  The  basic  differenee 
between state verbs and event verbs then is that: 
•  Nominally saturated state verbs are properties oftimes  . 
•  Nominally saturated event verbs are properties of  events. 
The  difference between state sentences  and non-state  sentences,  then,  appears "below" the 
tenses and "above" the VP. Following Klein (1994), Kratzer (1998), and others I assume the 
existence of two aspectual operators that turn predicates of events (nominally saturated event 
verbs) into predicates of times. These are the operators PERFECTIVE and PROGRESSIVE. 
If  we make the further natural assumption that these operators are syntactic heads, this seman-
tie contrast between state sentences and event sentences receives expression in the syntax, as 
illustrated in (19): 
(19)  a.  [TP  Sandy,  [T  PAST [A'pP  PERFECTIVE [vp t, kiss Kim]lll 
b.  [TP  Sandy, [T PAST [vp  t,  like Kim ]]] 
Note that there is  amismatch between syntactic category and  semantic type in the lexical 
vocabulary,  since  stative VPs  and  non-stative  VPs  are  of different  type.  Stative VPs  and 
eventive AspPs however share a semantic type: they are properties of  times. 
Our logical forms will be interpreted are respect to a structure (D,E,T,<,time-ot), where D is 
the domain of  individuals, among which E is the subset of  events, T is the set of  time intervals 
with ordering relation <.  The function time-of takes an event and returns its run-time (this is 
Krifka's (1989) 1:  function). 
The difference between the eventive kiss and the stative like is reflected by a difference in 
their lexical entries. Let us take a concrete example. Assuming that semantic combination is 
simply functional application we can, using the lexicon given below derive logical analyses of 
(19a)  and (l9b). Note that the  first  order variable t  ranges over times,  the  variable  e over 
events and the others over normal individuals. 
kiss; A Y A x A e [kiss(e,x,y)] 
like; A y A x A t [like(t,x,y)] 
PAST; A P:3 t [t<now & pet)] 
PERFECTIVE; At:3 e [P(e) & time-of(e) c  t] 
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The derivations, then, are as folIows: 
(20)  a.  Sandy kissed Kim. 
b.  [TP  Sandy, [T PAST [A'PP  PERFECTIVE [vp  t, kiss Kim lll] 
c.  3 t 3 e [kiss(e,Sandy,Kim) & time-of(e) c  t & t < now] 
(21)  a.  Sandy liked Kim. 
b.  [TP  Sandy, [T PAST [vp  t,  like Kim III 
c.  3 t [like(t,Sandy,Kim) & t < now] 
We have, of  course, simplified many ofthe less relevant issues, such as the treatment oftense. 
Nevertheless we get what we want: the claim on the one hand that there is a past time at which 
a kissing of Kim by Sandy occurred, and on the other the claim that there was a past time at 
which Kim liked Sandy. 
There  are  a number of features  of the  tense-aspect  system of English that  fall  out of the 
c1assical Davidsonian approach.  Consider, for example the English progressive. If we make 
the natural assumption that it  is  taken to  be the  morphological  expression of the  operator 
PROGRESSIVE defined below, which is the natural dual of the PERFECTIVE operator, we 
can explain some ofthe most obvious properties that the English progressive exhibits:4 
PROGRESSIVE; At 3 e [P(e) & t c  time-of(e)] 
The progressive, then, is  a function from  event predicates to time predicates, intuitively the 
time at which that event was going on.  Since the progressive is, effectively, a type shifter, it 
should not be able to apply either to state verbs, which are of the wrong type to act as 'input', 
or apply to its own output. This, of  course, is exactly what we find to be the case: 
(22)  a.  *John is owning a car. 
b.  *John is being kissing Mary. 
Furthermore, the well-known "stativizing" effect of the progressive (Vlach 1981) also gets a 
fairly straightforward account in this framework, since formally the function PROGRESSIVE 
is a stativizing operator, in that it turns predicates of  events into predicates of  times. 
4.3.  A Classical Davidsonian Account of Adverbial Modification 
Let us now look at how adverbs are treated. Like Thomason and Stalnaker's (1973) we distin-
guish adverbs that apply to the propositional content-probably, Jrankly from others. Further-
more, we distinguish temporal adverbials-yesterday, Jor an hour, on  Sunday-from event ad-
verbs -slowly, gently and the like. As would seem natural, temporal adverbs are taken to be 
predicates of times and  event adverbs  are  predicates of events.  For concreteness,  here  are 
some examples: 
slowly; A P A e [P(e) & slow(e)] 
yesterday ; A PA t [pet) & yesterday(t)] 
probably ; A P [PROB P] 
4  Tbis semanties should, ofeourse, be modalized. See Zueehi (1999) for arecent summing up ofthese issues. 
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The  intended  interpretation  of these  underlying  predicates  is  the  following.  When  slowly 
applies  to  an  event predicate it returns  a predicate of slow events  of the  same kind, when 
yesterday applies to a temporal predicate, it returns a predicate of times that were yesterday, 
and  when probably applies  to  a proposition P  it returns  a proposition that  is  tme if it  is 
probable that P. 
The mechanism of adverbial modification adopted here is fairly simple. In contrast to syntac-
tic theories such as that ofCinque (1999), I follow Wyner (1998) in assuming that the relative 
order of adverbials  follows  from  principles  of semantic  composition.  In  short,  adverbials 
adjoin freely to elements of  the extended verbal projection, subject only to semantic compati-
bility. There are two kinds of semantic compatibility to be considered. Certain restrictions are 
type-driven: For example, S-adverbials apply to propositional meanings (and therefore adjoin 
quite high, say to the TP projection), while temporal adverbs are properties of times, and so 
adjoin either to AspectP or to stative VPs.  Event adverbs only apply to  eventive VPs.  These 
adverbs are subj ect to the kind of  selectional restrictions discussed in Section 3 (as, in fact, are 
the others, as we shall make clear subsequently). 
Given a sentence such as (23a) in which there is a temporal adverb and an event adverb, the 
semantic combination is  fairly straightforward.  When everything functions  as  it should the 
event adverb combines with a compatible event predicate. An aspectual operator applies. And 
then a temporal adverb combines with the resulting time predicate.  (It should be clear that 
type-theoretical  restrictions  mle out any  other order of application of these  two  adverbs.) 
Finally a tense operator applies. The LF for (23a) is given in (23b) and the logical analysis in 
(23c). 
(23)  a.  John left slowly yesterday. 
b.  [TP  John1 [T PAST [A"PP  PERFECTIVE [vp t1 left slowly] yesterday]]] 
c.  :3  t [t < now & yesterday(t) &:3  [time-of(e) c  t & leave(e,John) & slow(e)]] 
This system would have to be modified, of course, to be compatible with a syntactic approach 
to  adverb placement: While the VP  domain is  taken to be the domain of event adverbs, TP 
domain the domain of S-adverbs, the domain of  temporal adverbs is disjunctively described as 
either (eventive) AspP or (stative) VP. This problem is not evident ifthe composition system 
is entirely semantically driven. 
4.4.  The SAG explained 
Like the restriction on stative progressives, the stative adverb gap is a direct consequence of 
the  stmcture of the  theory.  Since  adverbs  such  as  slowly  are,  underlyingly,  properties  of 
events, it is clear that they cannot apply to stative VPs, which are properties of times. This is 
not fundamentally different from  the claim that slowly, being a predicate of events, cannot 
apply to  states.  What makes  the  analysis  interesting is  that it  mIes out adverbs that  apply 
exclusively to stative verbs. 
Consider a potential adverb, state-adverb. To apply to stative VPs it must be of the same type 
as yesterday, that is, it must apply to properties of times. But if it is of this type then it could 
also  apply  to  eventive  AspectPs,  which are  also  interpreted  as  properties  of times.  If the 
semantic account of adverbial distribution is correct, there should be no adverb that can apply 
to a stative VP without also being able to apply to an eventive AspectP. 
From a semantic perspective an eventive predicate with an existentially closed event argument 
is  of the  same  type as  a  stative predicate.  Note that this  is  the  fundamental  claim of the 
classical Davidsonian account.  And this  is  a claim which is  independent of the  particular 
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implementation. Here we have assumed that stative predicates are simply predicates of  times. 
There is very little evidence that they should be treated otherwise. But even if one were to 
adopt the  view that stative predicates were predicates of underlying  states,  one could still 
maintain the classical Davidsonian perspective that existentially closed eventive predicates are 
of  the same semantic type as nominally saturated state verbs. This would amount to claiming 
that  the  aspectual  operators  are  functions  from  event  predicates  to  state  predicates.  This 
alteration would not fundarnentally undermine the results. As long as the fundamental insight 
that existentially closed event predicates are of the  same type as  state predicates, is main-
tained, it will be impossible for an adverb to exist that can combine with state predicates but is 
not of  the right type to combine with existentially c10sed event predicates. 
It should be noted that this does not quite mean that there cannot be adverbs that only appear 
in stative sentences. In fact, there are two adverbs that do: still and no longer. The existence of 
these two adverbs might at first seem to call into question not only the theory just proposed, 
but also the claim that there is  a stative adverb gap to  start with. As we will see in the next 
section, it is not as bad as all that. 
4.5.  Still and no longer 
It is quite clear that still and no longer appear only in state sentences. The contrast between 
the eventives in (24) and the stative sentence in (25) makes this clear. 
(24)  a.  *John kissed Mary no longer. 
b.  *  J  ohn still wrote a book. 
(25)  a.  John no longer owned a car. 
b.  J  ohn was still sick. 
c.  John was still kissing Mary. 
d.  John no longer worked in Stuttgart. 
Note that these adverbs combine not only with lexical stative verbs such as own but also with 
derived statives such as the progressive in (25c) and the generic in (25d). Semantically these 
adverbs are most naturally treated as  temporal adverbials, since they seem intuitively to add 
information  about  the  time  for  which  the  claim  is  taken  to  hold.  If they  are  temporal 
adverbials it is not particularly surprising that they appear with state verbs. The question, then, 
would be why they don't seem to combine with event predicates, or, to be more precise, with 
eventive AspPs. I think there is very good reason for this, however. The reason being that it 
would violate the selectional restrictions ofthese adverbials. 
Note that selectional restrictions of the standard kind are expected to  apply just as much to 
predicates of  times as they are to predicates of events. That is we expect there to be predicates 
of times  that  are  simply  incompatible  with  one  another.  In  fact,  this  is  a  weil  known 
phenomenon:  The classic cases  of in  an  hour and for an  hour,  which select for  different 
classes oftemporal predicates, can be seen in this light. 
(26)  a.  Peter ran the race in an hour. 
b.  *Peter owned a vacation house in the Alps in an hour. 
(27)  a.  ??Peter ran the race for an hour. 
b.  Peter owned a vacation house in the Alps for an hour. 
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Although both adverbials are predieates oftimes, beeause of  the lexieal semanties of  temporal 
in  and for the  former  is  eompatible  with eertain  types  of event  verbs,  while  the  latter  is 
eompatible with state verbs. The literature on this topie is extensive and varied (Dowty 1979, 
Hinriehs  1985,  Krifka  1989,  Moltmann  1991,  Zueehi  and  White  1996).  There  is  general 
agreement, however, that the contrast is due to purely temporal properties of  the modifiers. 
There is, then, normal seleetional restrietion, in the domain oftemporal predieates. And as we 
have  already  diseussed  one  of the  features  of seleetional  restrictions  is  that  they  are 
symmetrie. So we expect there to be temporal modifiers that select for the temporal properties 
of event verbs  to  the  exc1usion  of state  verbs  and  temporal  modifiers  that  select  for  the 
temporal properties of state verbs to the exc1usion of event verbs. I would suggest, then, that 
in  an  hour is an example of the former,  while still and na langer are  examples of the latter. 
They  are,  then,  temporal  modifiers  which  happen  to  be  compatible  with  the  temporal 
properties of  stative verbs but not with the temporal properties of eventive verbs. 
In  fact,  when  we  consider what  the  semantics  of still  should  look  like,  it is  no  longer 
surprising that it should select for state verbs. Intuitively still P means that P is true at some 
time t, that it was true at some time t' previous to that, and that it has been true at all the times 
in between t and t'. This is formalized in (28). 
(28)  sti11;AP[P(t)&3t'[t' <t&P(t')&'itu  [t' <tu  <t---+P(tu )]]] 
This analysis makes it quite c1ear why still selects for state verbs: it requires that the temporal 
predicate  it  applies  to  have  the  subinterval  property.  It is  well  known  that  this  is  one  of 
temporal properties that state verbs have but event verbs lack.  Similar comments hold in the 
case of  na langer. 
These are, so to  speak, counterexamples that indeed prove the rule. Both event sentences and 
state sentences have components whose denotations are predicates of times. Given what we 
have  said about selectional restrictions, it would be a surprise if the selectional restrictions 
that  applied  at  this  level  were  insensitive  to  the  statelevent  contrast.  In  asense,  it  is  a 
prediction of the theory that there be temporal adverbials that are acceptable only in stative 
sentences  as  well  as  temporal adverbials  that  are  acceptable  only in  event  sentences.  The 
existence of the adverbs still and na langer, then, is no problem at all. There is, however, one 
real difficulty to be addressed. I do so in the next section. 
5.  A Problem with the Account: Stative 'Manner' Adverbs 
Given the  above  account,  we  would  expect that  stative verbs  should only be  modifed by 
temporal and propositional adverbs. This, however, is c1early not the case. There are a number 
of adverbs  that  combine  felicitously  with  state  verbs,  but  which would  not  normally  be 
c1assified as temporal or propositional. Some examples are given in (29). 
(29)  a.  Peter knew Maria well. 
b.  Lisa firmly believed that he was innocent. 
c.  Mary loves Max passianately. 
I would hasten to add that these adverbs aren't exceptions to  the SAG,  as  they all combine 
event verbs as weil: 
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(30)  a.  Peter played the song well. 
b.  Lisa held the door firrnly. 
c.  Mary kissed Max passionately. 
The adverbs in (29) do, however, behave very much like manner modifiers of  event verbs, and 
that is what makes them troublesome. For example, as we mentioned above,  one of the pro-
perties  of manner adverbs  is  that  they  are  c10sely  related  semantically  to  their  adjectival 
cognates. This seems to be the case for the adverbs in (29) as weil. Also in the case of state 
verbs  can we derive  a synonymous  expression by nominalizing the  verb  and applying the 
cognate adjective to it.  So (29c) seems synonymous with (31a) in much the way that (30c) is 
with (31b). 
(31)  a.  Mary's love for Max is passionate. 
b.  Mary's kissing ofMax was passionate. 
One  of the  advantages  of the  neo-Davidsonian  approach  was  that  it  made  sense  of this 
synonymy  in  a  straightforward  way.  In  both  (30c)  and  (31 b)  the  underlying  predicate 
passionate applies to a kissing event. And on the neo-Davidsonain analysis of  (29c) and (31a) 
the underlying predicate passionate is predicated of  an underlying state, as in (32). 
(32)  :3  s [love(s,Mary,Max) & passionate(s)] 
This treatment, of course, is  inconsistent with the classical Davidsonian analysis,  since the 
central  assumption of that  analysis  is  that  state  verbs  do  not  have  underlying  eventuality 
arguments.  The  question,  then,  is  whether  the  kind  of modification  illustrated  in  (29)  -
'manner' modification of state verbs - is enough like event modification to force us to reject 
the classical Davidsonian account. 
There are two features of 'manner' modification of  state verbs that lead me doubt that it really 
is parallel to event modification. First, the state verbs that can be modified by particular ad-
verbs are lexical selected in a rather strict sense:  love combines with passionately and know 
with weil, but not the other way around, and neither ofthese adverbs combine with own. This 
contrasts sharply with the case of event verbs, where there is semantic but not lexical selec-
tion: speak, kiss,  and even eat all combine with passionately and weil. This may just mean 
that  states  are  more  finely  grained than events,  but altemately it might  mean  that we  are 
dealing with phrasal idioms of a sort. Secondly, when they modify state verbs, these adverbs 
appear to  be exc1usively interpreted as  degree modifiers.  Although there is  certainly some 
affective content associated with the word passionate, truth-conditionally (33a) means ab out 
the same as (33b). 
(33)  a.  He loves her more passionately than she does hirn. 
b.  He loves her more than she does hirn. 
This, again, is in stark contrast to  event modification. (34a) is certainly not synonymous with 
(34b). 
(34)  a.  He kissed her more passionately than she did hirn. 
b.  He kissed her more than she did hirn. 
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We will discuss degree modification shortly. The point here is simply that in the case of event 
verbs, VP adverbs express a whole range of properties of events, from their auditory quality 
(loudly) to the mood oftheir agent (grumpily), while in the case of state verbs they seem only 
to indicate the degree to which an individual can be claimed to have a given property. 
Even Parsons accepts that degree modifiers  such as partway are not to  be treated as  event 
predicates. He points out that the typical pattern of entailments associated with event adverbs 
is not found in examples containingpartway. (35a), for example, does not entail (35b). 
(35)  a.  Max filled the tank partway. 
b.  Max filled the tank. 
When they modify  event  verbs,  such  modifiers  seem  to  indicate  the  degree  to  which the 
underlying event is of the type described by the verb. In (35a), then, the claim being made is 
that there was an event of  which Max was the agent that was partial a tank filling.  This con-
trasts with the way degree modification of  state verbs behaves. Consider the contrast in (36). 
(36)  a.  Max barely kissed Alissa. 
b.  Max barely knows Alissa. 
In (36a) the claim is that the event wasn't much of a kiss, that is that there was an event and it 
was a kissing, but it only barely qualifies as one. Whereas in (36b), the claim seems to be that 
the degree to which Max knows Alissa is very smalI. To put things another way, on the one 
hand it is the degree to which a particular event qualifies as belonging to a certain type which 
is being measured, on the other hand it is the degree to which an individual can be said to 
have a certain property. Without introducing a full-blown semantics of degrees, we can see 
that this is, at least in form, what we expect from a classical Davidsonian account: 
(37)  a.  :J  e [barely(kiss)(e,Max,Alissa)]] 
b.  barely(known)(Mary,Max) 
The basic idea, then, is that the kind of adverbs that we see appearing with stative verbs but 
which clearly are not temporal or propositional modifiers are, in the end, predicate modifiers. 
It is  at  the  level of predicates,  I would suggest,  that degree modification takes place.  This 
accounts both for why it is available for state verbs as well as event verbs (one thing they have 
in common is that they are predicates). 
Of course this is  all rather sketchy,  and how this semantic proposal is to  be fleshed out is 
certainly the subject for additional research. Furthermore, how this proposal can be reconciled 
with the  facts  about nominalization is still somewhat of an open question. Clearly nominals 
such as  his love for her must be given an analysis. Perhaps an  analysis along the lines of the 
nominalized properties of Chierchia and Turner (1987)  would be the  most natural,  taking 
these nominals to be terms that refer directly to properties. Once we take this step, however, 
we would seem to  be left with questions to  answer about the  treatment of event nominals. 
Why, then, aren't they also to be treated as property nominalizations 
An alternative is  to treat the nominalization phenomenon as  purely syntactic. I have only a 
speculation as to how this can be made to work: Under Marantz' (1999) theory of distributed 
morphology, lexical items enter the derivation without category specification, and that this is 
supplied later in the derivation. On this kind of theory, then, LOVE DEEP is a lexical idiom 
that enters the derivation as a unit and acquires the appropriate categorial status syntactically. 
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When introduced in a nominal context it is pronounced deep love (as in his deep love for her), 
while  in  a  verbal  context it is  pronounced love  deeply.  Such  an  account  would have  the 
advantage of making sense of the  strict lexical  selection we noted at the beginning of this 
section,  since this  kind of modification is,  essentially,  lexical.  Furthermore the  distinction 
between predicate modifiers, which are lexically introduced, and event modifiers, which are 
not, is made overt in the syntax. 
I do  not find this discussion entirely satistying, however, not because I think it points to a 
particular strength of  the neo-Davidsonian approach over the c1assical Davidsonian, but rather 
because I fear that it indicates that the Davidsonian notion of  event modification as simple co-
predication, is so simple as to be wrong. It is c1ear that there are any number of  VP modifiers 
that  are  event modifiers, but which,  semantically don't look at  all  like event modifiers.  In 
(38a) it is not the devouring event that is hungry, but the !ion. In (38b) it is not the event that 
is temporary, but rather Peter's absence from the university. 
(38)  a.  The !ion devoured the deer hungrily. 
b.  Peter left the university temporarily. 
What these and many other examples illustrate is that event co-predication, of  the sort argued 
for by Davidson, is really only one of a number of  kinds of modification available, perhaps it 
is even simply a farnily of other more specific kinds of modification. Degree modification is 
another type (or farnily of types).  Trying to  make all  kinds of VP modification fit  into the 
same  mold  by  introducing  an  underlying  argument  for  every  element  that  needs  to  be 
modified may seem good when the number of  kinds of such elements is small. But when the 
number starts to  grow the plausibility (not to  speak of the tractabi!ity) of such an analysis 
becomes  questionable.  The  problems  I  hope  to  have  raised  for  treating  VP  adverbial 
modification of state verbs in a neo-Davidsonian fashion seems, then,  to  be only part of a 
more general reconsideration of how the fine  structure of adverbial modification should be 
addressed. 
6.  Conclusion 
In summary, then, I have claimed that there is a missing class of  adverbs, narnely adverbs that 
select only for state verbs, whose non-existence is not accounted for in the literature. I have 
further argued that this stative adverb gap (SAG) is not plausibly accounted for on the basis of 
adverbial selectional restrictions. I suggest that the gap is far too systematic to be accidental. 
The central claim of  the paper, then, is that the SAG arises from the structure of  the theory of 
sentence interpretation. I then laid out the bare bones of a particular theory, which I called the 
classical Davidsonian theory,  in  which the  event state contrast is  analyzed in terms of the 
presence or absence  of an underlying  eventuality argument.  State verbs  do  not  have  such 
arguments. Further adopting a semantic theory of adverbial modification, I showed how the 
SAG  follows  from  the  classical  Davidsonian  assumptions.  Somewhat  surprisingly,  the 
potential counterexamples still and no longer were actually shown to  vindicate the !ine of 
argument  taken in the paper.  Finally we  were perplexed by  the  existence of adverbs  that 
behave much as we might expect adverbial predicates ofunderlying states to behave. We have 
suggested that this is due to their being an instance of lexical predicate modification. Whether 
this can be made to work, and how this influences the analysis of  eventive modification is left 
as an open question. 
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